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Abstract.  We critically analyze the results and claims in [Physics Letters A 373
(2009) 901–904].
We show that the strong security leak appeared in the simulations is only an
artifact and not caused by "multiple reflections". Since no wave modes exist at cable
length of 5% of the shortest wavelength of the signal, no wave is present to reflect it.
In the high wave impedance limit, the conditions used in the simulations are
heavily unphysical (requiring cable diameters up to 28000 times greater than the
measured size of the known universe) and the results are modeling artifacts due to the
unphysical values. 
At the low cable impedance limit, the observed artifacts are due to violating the
recommended (and tested) conditions by neglecting the cable capacitance restrictions
and using about 100 times longer cable than recommended without cable capacitance
compensation arrangement.
We implement and analyze the general circuitry of Liu's circulator [Physics
Letters A 373 (2009) 901–904] and confirm that they are conceptually secure against
passive attacks. We introduce an asymmetric, more robust version without feedback
loop. Then we crack all these systems by an active attack: a circulator-based man-in-
the middle attack.
Finally, we analyze the proposed method to increase security by dropping only
high-risk bits. We point out the differences between different types of high-risk bits
and show the shortage of this strategy for some simple key exchange protocols.
http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.2071               March 11, 13, May 23, 2009.
21. Introduction
In a recent paper [1] a circulator-based development and computer simulations
have been published about the secure key exchange system utilizing Kirchhoff's Law
and Johnson-like noise (KLJN cypher) [2-6], which is, at the moment, the only
classical physical system offering unconditional security in the idealized limit. If the
claims in [1] were valid, they could be of high impact on the future of the KLJN type
systems. In the present paper, we give a critical analysis of the results and claims in
[1], especially about the circulator arrangement, the theory, the computer simulations
of the original system proposed in [2] and their interpretations, and about the proposal
of dropping high-risk bits to enhance security.
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Figure 1. Model of the idealized KJLN cypher (secure key exchange system) [2].
First we briefly survey the necessary background to help the reader to follow the
argumentations. Figure 1 shows the model of the idealized KLJN cypher designed for
secure key exchange in [2]. The resistor RL and RH represent the low, L (0), and high,
H (1), bits, respectively. At each clock period, Alice and Bob randomly choose one of
the resistors and connect it to the wire line. The situation LH or HL represents secure
bit exchange [2], while LL and HH  are insecure. The Gaussian voltage noise
generators (white noise with publicly agreed bandwidth) represent a corresponding
thermal noise at publicly agreed effective temperatures Teff  (typically Teff > 1 billion
Kelvins [3]). The power density spectra Su,L ( f ) and Su,H ( f ) of the voltages UL,A (t)
and UL,B (t) supplied by the voltage generators in RL  and RH  are given by:
3Su,L ( f ) = 4kTeff RL       and    Su,H ( f ) = 4kTeff RH , (1)
respectively.
In the case of secure bit exchange (LH or HL situations), the power density spectrum
of channel voltage Uch (t)  and channel current Ich (t)  are given as (see [2] for further
details):
Su,ch ( f ) = 4kTeff
RLRH
RL + RH
 (2)
and
Si,ch (t) =
4kTeff
RL + RH
(3)
Observe that during the LH  or H L situation, due to linear superposition,
Equation-2 is the sum of the spectrum of two situations: When only the generator in
R
L
 is running:
SL,u,ch ( f ) = 4kTeff RL
RH
RL + RH
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and when the generator in R
H
 is running:
SH ,u,ch ( f ) = 4kTeff RH
RL
RL + RH
 
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 
  
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(5)
The ultimate security of the system against passive attacks is provided by the fact
that the power P
HL  with which resistor RH  is heating RL  is equal to the power
P
LH  with which resistor RL  is heating RH  [2]. This follows directly from the
second law of thermodynamics and the energy conservation law; the proof can also be
derived from Equation 3 for a frequency bandwidth of f  by:
4PLH =
SL,u,ch ( f )f
RH
= 4kTeff
RLRH
(RL + RH )
2
(6a)
PHL =
SH ,u,ch ( f )f
RL
= 4kTeff
RLRH
(RL + RH )
2
(6b)
The equality P
HL=PLH  (see Equations 6) is in accordance with the second law of
thermodynamics; violating this equality would mean not only violating basic laws of
physics, but also that the eavesdropper (Eve) could utilize the voltage-current
crosscorrelation Uch (t)Ich (t) , which is normally zero, to extract the bit [2].
Any deviations from this circuitry, including parasitic elements, inaccuracies,
non-Gaussianity of the noise, etc. will cause potential information leak toward Eve [7-
10]. For further analysis design aspects and comparisons, see [3,8,10]. The situation is
similar to quantum key exchange systems, which are the only unconditionally secure
competitors of the KLJN system. However, they assume idealistic situations (e.g.
single photon source, noise-free channel) which are unreachable in a real physical
system. The experimental results in [3] clearly demonstrate that the KLJN cypher
outperforms the raw-bit security of conceptual quantum communicators. Because of
the non-zero information leak due to non-ideality effects, both the KLJN and quantum
communicators require privacy amplification [11] of the raw bits, which is a proper
algorithmic transformation making a shorter key of high security from the longer raw
key of low security.
To provide unconditional security against invasive attacks, the fully armed KLJN
cypher system is monitoring the instantaneous current and voltage values, at both
ends (i.e., Alice and also Bob) [3,12], and these values are compared either via
broadcasting them or via an authenticated public channel. It is important to note that
these current and voltage data contain all the information Eve can have. This implies
that Alice and Bob have full knowledge about the information Eve may have; a
particularly important property of the KLJN system that can be utilized in secure key
exchange. This situation implies the following important features of the KLJN
system:
51. The KLJN system is always unconditionally secure, even when it is non-ideal, in
the following sense. The current and voltage data inform Alice and Bob about the
exact information leak. Hence, they can always decide either to shot down the
communication or to take the risk. Notice that this is a stronger property than that of
quantum communicators.
2. Even when the communication is jammed by invasive attacks or inherent non-
idealities in the KLJN system, the system remains secure because no information can
be eavesdropped by Eve without the full knowledge of Alice and Bob about this
potential incidence, and without the full information Eve might have extracted, see
also Section 3.
3. The KLJN system is naturally and fully protected against the man-in-the-middle
attack [12], even during the very first run of the operation when no hidden signatures
can be applied yet. This feature is provided by the unique property of the KLJN
system that zero bit information can only be extracted during a man-in-the-middle
attack because the alarm goes on before the exchange of a single key bit has taken
place [12].
The outline of the prototype of he KLJN cypher [3] is shown in Figure 2. The various
non-idealities have been addressed by different tools with the aim that the information
leak due to non-idealities should stay below 1% of the exchanged raw key bits. It is
important to note that while 1% is about the lowest limit an idealistic quantum
communicator may achieve, for the KLJN cypher it was 0.19% for the best attack [3].
In the present paper, we are only concerned about two of these tools (see also Section
2):
(i) The role of the line filter (and that of the band limitation of the noise generator) is
to provide the no-wave limit in the cable (see Figure 2). That is, the shortest
wavelength component in the driving noises should be much longer than the double of
the cable length in order to guarantee that no active wave modes and related effects
(e.g., reflection, invasive attacks at high frequencies, etc.) take place in the cable.
While in [2] an upper limit for the cable length of 10% of the shortest noise
wavelength was proposed, the system was tested in [3] with parameters relevant to
6cable length of 5% of the shortest noise wavelength.
(ii) Another tool to fight non-idealities is the cable capacitance compensation
(capacitor killer) arrangement (see Figure 2). With practical cable parameters and
their limits, there is a more serious threat of the security: the cable capacitance
shortcuts part of the noise current and that results in a greater current at the side of the
lower resistance end yielding an information leak. This effect can be avoided by a
cable-capacitor-killer [3] using the inner wire of a coax cable as KLJN line while the
outer shield of the cable is driven by the same voltage as the inner wire. However, this
is done via a follower voltage amplifier with zero output impedance. The outer shield
will then provide all the capacitive currents toward the ground and the inner wire will
experience zero parasitic capacitance. Without capacitor killer arrangement and
practical bare-wire line parameters, the recommended upper limit of cable length is
much shorter depending on the driving resistor values  RL and RH . For example, the
reported measurements in [3] used 5 kHz noise bandwidth and 2 km range for the
capacitor killer arrangement. That was 5% of the wavelength corresponding to the 5
kHz cut-off frequency. However, without capacitor killer, the allowed upper limit for
bare-wire arrangement would have been only 1% of the range limit mentioned above
(see page 980 in [3]), that is, only 0.05% of the wavelength, which is 20 meters.
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Figure 2. The tested KLJN cypher [3]. Double-ended arrows symbolize computer control.
72. Security: theory, circulators, cables and modeling.
In this section, we focus on the physical aspects and implications of the claims in [1].
2.1 The "no-wave" frequency regime
First, we provide the valid physical picture about cables in the no-wave limit.
These considerations are well known for a very long time and we use standard
textbook material, as well as well-established classical theories and pictures [13-15].
We first address the theory describing cable reflections in [1] and [7].
Electromagnetic waves are described as wave solutions of the Maxwell
Equations [13], where half of the wave energy is carried by the electrical field and the
other half by the magnetic field. Stationary wave solutions in a finite size cable are
given by a Fourier series consisting of propagating forward and backward wave
modes. The lowest frequency wave mode's wavelength is the double of the cable
length. Since no lower frequency wave modes exist in a cable, lower frequency signal
components do not propagate as a wave, but as a retarded (no-wave) potential or a
near field around an antenna. Thus, such a propagating potential lacks of basic wave
properties, such as interference and reflection.
Therefore, Equations 1-6 in [1] containing reflection and transmission
coefficients, which are intended to describe the original system [2] and the new
circulator-based setup [1], are invalid because no reflection can exist at the given
conditions of no-wave regime: cable length is at most 5% of the shortest signal
wavelength, the essential regime of security [2,3,8]. A simple example from optics
clearly illustrates this situation: using a 500 nanometers visible light for
communication, the maximal allowed length of the optical fiber would be 0.05*500=
25 nanometers. This means that only about 100 atoms would separate the outputs of
Alice and Bob: they are virtually collocated!
2.2 Cables and their simulation in the no-wave limit
Cables in the high-frequency limit can be described by a distributed RLC
network (see Figure 3). In this picture, wave means a propagating voltage/current
disturbance with half of the energy in the capacitors due the voltage of the wave and
half in the inductors due to the current of the wave. For example, driving a cable at
8one end with a voltage generator in the no-wave (low-frequency) limit with no load at
the other end means no current because the impedance of the capacitors is large and
thus there is no current and related energy in the inductors. Hence, all the electrical
energy is present only in the capacitors and therefore not in a wave mode. Time delay
effects in such case are no-wave types of retarded potentials and thus, they neither get
reflected nor do interfere like waves do.
LiRi Li+1 Li+2Ri+1 Ri+2
Ci+1Ci Ci+2
Figure 3. The cable is a distributed RLC network. Wave means a propagating disturbance where half
of the energy is carried by the capacitors and the other half by the inductors. Other types of
disturbances do not have wave properties, such as interference and reflection.
In the cable simulations presented in [1] the cables were characterized by their wave
impedance Z0 . The wave impedance of the cable in the high-frequency limit is given
as
Z0 =
L0
C0
, (7)
where L0 and C0 are the characteristic cable inductance and capacitance relevant for
1 meter cable length, respectively. It is important to recognize that the wave
impedance alone does not determine the cable behavior at such short distances and
provides only the ratio L0 /C0  , but not the actual values of L0 and C0 . There is an
infinite number of pairs of cable capacitance and inductance for a given wave
impedance because only the ratio of L and C  is determined. This has important
implications. The resultant generator resistance driving the cable at the two ends will
determine if the cable shows capacitive or inductive response.  For example, in the
case of high-resistance drive and short cable (no-wave regime), cable capacitance
effects will dominate the transfer characteristics and the wave impedance does not
contain enough information to determine the behavior because it leaves the actual
capacitance value undetermined. Thus, for simulations in such a case like in [1], the
9wave impedance alone is irrelevant (see also Section 2.5).
a
b
Figure 4. Cross-sectional view of the coaxial cable and the related definitions: a is the diameter of the
inner wire and b is the internal diameter of the outer shield.
In this paper, we focus on coaxial (coax) cables (see Figure 4) because of their
potential for capacitor killer arrangement. However sometimes we will also show that
two-wire lines result in a similar conclusion. The approximate characteristic
capacitance and inductance of coax cables are given as [14,15] :
C0 =
2r0
ln(b /a)
   (Farad/meter) , (8)
L0 =
μrμ0 ln(b /a)
2   (Henry/meter) . (9)
With the practical values of  the relative permeability μ
r
= 1 , the wave impedance is
[14,15]:
Z0 =
138
r ln(b /a)  ( /meter ) (10)
and, in case of given wave impedance, inner wire diameter a, and relative dielectric
constant 
r
 , the required inner diameter of shield (the lower limit of coax cable
diameter) is:
b  =  a  exp
Z0 r
138
  (meter) (11)
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Supposing a coax cable and Z0 = 100    (see Figure 4a in [1]), and dielectric constant

r
= 1, a=1 mm, we obtain d= 2.1 mm. The characteristic inductance (Equation 9) is
L0=1.48*10
-07
 Henry/meter and the total inductance of the simulated 2 kilometers line
in [1] is L= 2.96*10
-4
 Henry.  The impedance of that inductance at the allowed highest
frequency in the noise bandwidth is ZL (5kHz) = 9.29  which is far below the value
R
w
= 200    of practical resistance of the cable in [3]. Thus, the voltage drop in the
wire is purely dominated by the resistance (Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv effect [3]).
The lower limit (
r
= 1) of characteristic capacitance is C0=8*10
-11
 Farad/meter,
which is at the lower end of practical values. Thus, the lower limit of total cable
capacitance for the 2 kilometers length in [1] is C=1.6*10
-7
 Farad.
To show the non-existence of reflections from another aspect, we give a
pessimistic estimation about the possibility of oscillations by concentrating the
distributed RLC elements of the cable into discrete circuit elements (see Figure 5).
The quality factor Q of the concentrated RLC serial resonator is:
Q =
L /R
LC
=  0.0228 (12)
where R  is now the sum of R
w
= 200    and the resultant diving resistance
(1.69k  =  2k 11k) used by Alice and Bob.
Lw
RLRH
RL + RH
Cw
Q  0.023 , strongly overdamped
(critical damping Q = 0.5)
Figure 5. The cable capacitance, cable inductance, cable resistance and driving resistance can be
concentrated into lumped circuit elements when the cable length is much shorter than the signal
wavelength. When the driving resistance is much greater than the wave impedance of the cable, the
cable acts as a capacitor and the inductance can be neglected.
Such an extremely low Q factor means that the cable with these parameters is a totally
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overdamped system with neither reflections nor oscillations because the critical limit
of the overdamped (non-oscillating) range is Q = 0.5 . Below this limit, the system
shows no oscillation but a monotonic relaxation. This is another, phenomenologic
interpretation why reflections cannot occur in the frequency range of the no-wave
regime. This holds not only for the concentrated circuitry, but also for the cable with
the distributed elements. The reason is that, for the distributed elements, the
2 LiCi( )1 eigenfrequencies are higher and thus they are more beyond the noise
bandwidth than those of the concentrated elements. When the driving resistance is
much greater than the wave impedance of the cable, like here, the cable acts as a
capacitor and the inductance can be neglected. Therefore, if any oscillation had been
observed during the simulations that would have been an artifact (e.g. errors caused
by stray frequency components due to aliasing issues, etc.).
r
d
r
Figure 6. Cross-sectional view of the two-wire cable and the related definitions: r is the
diameter of the inner wire and d is the distance between the centers of the wires (d>r).
For practical free-standing two-wire lines [14,15] we have the corresponding
quantities (see Figure 6 for definitions):
C0 =
r0
ln (d  r0) /r0[ ]   Farad/meter (13)
Z0  =  276  log10(d /r)    ,   thus      d = r  10
Z0 /276  , (14)
with similar implications.
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2.3 High-impedance simulation results in [1]: heavily unphysical parameters
Here we explore the implications of cable parameters used for the simulations in [1].
In Section 2.2, we have already pointed out that the wave impedance is a completely
irrelevant parameter for the given combination of cable length and frequency band.
We now show that the simulations used in [1] in the high wave impedance regime
( 2 k  <  Z0 <  11 k) inherently assume heavily unphysical cable parameters.
Below we suppose 
r
=1 and μ
r
=1 which are around the practical cable values. Using
materials with 
r
=30000, the value around the maximum in ferroelectric ceramics,
which are non-usable for cables, the predicted sizes below will shrink by a factor of
30000 170 (see Equation 11) and they still stay unphysical or unpractical. We
arrive at similar conclusions for high μ
r
 materials, too.  Furthermore, using

r
=30000, would further enhance the capacitance problems discussed below (in
Section 2.4) and that 30000 times greater cable capacitance would kill the secure
communication, even at 1% of the present range and at any wave impedance.
With a coax cable of Z0 = 11 k  (see [1]), inner wire diameter of 1 millimeter
and 
r
= 1 , according to Equation 11 in Section 2.2, the required coax shield diameter
is 4.15*10
31
 meters. This is more than 28000 times greater than the size of the known
universe (156 billion light years = 1.48*10
27
 meters [16])!
At Z0 = 4.7  k (see the simulation data in Figure 4b in [1]), the required cable
diameter is 6.18*10
11
 meters which is about the same size as the mean distance of the
Earth and Jupiter (7.79*10
11
 meters) [17].
At Z0 = 2  k  [1], which is the boundary case of the two observed type of
behaviors of current and voltages in [1], the required cable diameter is 1.97
kilometers, which is basically the same size as the 2 kilometers range of
communication, that is, the length of the cable in [1].
Though our focus is on coax cables, we note that the situation of two-wire lines
produces even more unphysical values. With  r = 1 millimeter and Z0 = 11 k ,
Equation 14 yields d = 7.16*10
36
 meters which is more than one billion times greater
than the known size of the universe (see above). With Z0 = 4.7  k (Figure 4 b in [1])
d = 1.1*10
14
 meters which is about 20 times greater than the planetaric-size of the
solar system (the mean distance of the Sun and Pluto is 5.9*10
12
 meters [18]). With
Z0 = 2  k , [1] the distance d between the cables is 17.6 km, 8.8 times longer than the
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range of communication (2 kilometers), that is, the modeled cable length [1].
Therefore, we regard all the simulation results for the high impedance range,
2 k  <  Z0 <  11 k, including Figure 4 b in [1], as massively non-physical. They
are unphysical because, among others, the cable equations and simulation programs
are all based on the key assumptions that the length of the cable is much greater than
its diameter.
It is an open question how the applied simulation program LTSpice accepted and
processed the massively unphysical cable parameters. The clarification of this
question is out of the scope of our paper. Though the unphysical nature of the large
wave impedance parts of the simulations makes further considerations unnecessary,
we also note that if the data in the LTSpice program did not get corrupted by the non-
physical parameters then the observed difference of the voltages can be simply due to
the cable inductance which would be huge at such diameters. When the cable
inductance is large enough so that its impedance ZL ( f ) = 2L  becomes comparable
to the resultant resistance of driving by Alice and Bob (see below), the inductance
will separate Alice and Bob and a similar security breach takes place as with the wire
resistance issue [4,7,8].
2.4 Low-cable-impedance simulation results in [1]: cable capacitance artifacts
As mentioned above, according to earlier estimations (see [3], page 981) using
the driving resistances discussed above, without capacitor killer arrangement only 1%
of the nominal communication length (i.e. 0.05% of the wavelength) could have been
utilized as range in [3]. Cable parameters in the simulations in [1] with the low wave
impedances (see Figure 4a in [1]) violate this standard practical recommendation and
assumption about handling the cable capacitance problems. The same high driving
resistance values as in the experiments in [3] ( 2k,  11k) are used in the simulations
in [1] for the same range (2 kilometers), but without capacitor killer. Notice that this is
100 times longer cable than allowed. Thus the low wave-impedance simulation results
are cable capacitance artifacts (see point (ii) in Section 1) and hence, in contrast to the
conclusion in [1], they do not imply the insecurity of the KLJN cypher. Of course, not
surprisingly, the KLJN cypher may become insecure in case of inappropriate use.
Note, however, that remark 1 about unconditional security given in Section 1 still
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holds because Alice and Bob have full knowledge about Eve's information (see also
Section 4).
With the simulated arrangements in [1], where no capacitor killer was applied
and the length was at 2 km, the resistors of Alice and Bob were virtually shortcut by
the cable capacitance in the high-frequency range, where the dominant portion of the
noise power is located. The simple model of this case is shown in Figure 7, together
with the relevant equations for the high-capacitance limit. The impedance of the
capacitance is much less than RL, therefore the capacitor represents a short circuit
toward the ground and the currents at Alice and Bob's ends are simply the thermal
noise currents of the noise voltage generators.
Cw
Alice
RL RH
Bob
UL,A(t) UH,B(t)
IL,A(t)
Teff Teff
IH,B(t)
In the high Cw limit:
Si,L,A( f ) = 4kTeff /RL
Si,H,B( f ) = 4kTeff /RH
Si,H,B << Si,L,A
Figure 7. Illustration of the cable capacitance artifact leading to incorrect conclusion about the security
of the KLJN cypher during the low wave impedance simulations in [1].
The current will be greater at the end with the lower resistance, just like it was
observed in [1]. In the worst case, the ratio of the currents of the two sides is RH/RL .
Supposing that Alice has the 2  k and Bob the 11 k resistance, the mean-square
current at Alice's side can be 5.5 times greater than Bob's in the worst case. This
implies that Bob's effective current amplitude is only 42% of the current at Alice's
end. The current amplitudes shown in Figure 4a in [1] support this observation, even
though we have no information about the value of the actual cable capacitance
LTSpice used for the simulation.
Let us make a more accurate estimation with the practical cable data used in
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Section 2.2 by using the lower practical limit of total cable capacitance for the 2
kilometers length (C=1.6*10
-7
 Farad). For the resultant driving resistance
R = 1.69  k we get fc = 1/2RC   0.59  kHz . Since the total noise bandwidth is
5 kHz , the band 0.59  kHz  <  f  <  5  kHz  is cut off by the cable capacitance. This
means that only about 12% of the total noise power is used for communication; the
rest, 88% is shorted by the cable capacitance. This implies a serious security risk.
Using higher dielectric constants would make this error progressively worse and, at
the maximal value of 
r
=30000 mentioned above, no security would exist even at 1%
of the 2 kilometers range.
On the other hand, using the usual 
r
1, at the 1% of the 2 km length (20
meters) would result in a cutoff frequency of 59.63 kHz and guarantee that the
capacitive shunt currents stay sufficiently low to achieve the aimed raw bit
information leak in the order of 1% [3, 8,10]. Similarly, using a capacitor killer
arrangement designed to compensate out 99% of the cable capacitance at 2 kilometer
distance would result in the same satisfactory situation.
Finally, note that Eve could use much more efficient tools than in [1], e.g. by
calculating the mean product (crosscorrelation) of the time-derivative of the line
voltage and the currents at the two ends of the line. The side where this product is
greater has the L bit.
3. Analyzing and generalizing the circulator-based key exchange proposed in [1]
In [1] a new secure key exchange system utilizing circulators to emulate the KLJN
cypher was introduced. Due to the lack of a detailed circuit analysis in [1] the security
aspects and weaknesses of the circulator-based system were not clear. In this section
we show a generalized circulator circuitry, deduce its relevant equations and show
how to design such a secure communicator. Surprisingly, the knowledge of the
Johnson noise equations is unnecessary for the security design. We show a major
weakness of all circulator-based key exchange systems: their absolute vulnerability
against a circulator-based man-in-the-middle attack. Finally, we point out that the
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original, circulator-free, Johnson noise based KLJN system is secure even against
circulator based man-in-the-middle attacks.
3.1 The circulator circuitry and how does it work
Circulators are usually passive circuit elements for high-frequency applications. In
[1], an active, circuit-based system is cited (reference [19] here) which emulates most
of the essential properties of a circulator. We have analyzed the function of the
circuitry in [19] and we constructed a general circulator circuitry (see Figure 8).
Despite its simplicity with respect to the system in [19], it has the same function.
Another advantage of the circuit in Figure 8 is that it does not change the sign of the
voltage between ports, which is an artifact in [19].
–
+
–
–
+
–
+
+
–
+
–
Z
0
Z
0
Z
0
Z
0
Z
0
Z
0
Port 1 Port 2 Port 3
CVC 1 CVC 2 CVC 3
VA 1 VA 2 VA 3
+
Figure 8. Generalized circuit scheme to emulate passive circulators (within the dashed line area). An
improved version of the circuitry cited in [1] (Ref [19] here). VA stands for differential voltage
amplifier with amplification of 2 and CVC stands current-voltage converter with amplification Z0 ,
respectively.
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Figure 9. Explanation of the function of the general circulator circuit. Port 1 is driven by a voltage
generator of voltage U and internal resistance Z0. Then a voltage of U/2 will drop on Port 1 and driven
by the current I flowing into Port 1, the circulator distills the same U/2 voltage on the next port (Port
2). The subsequent port (Port 3) stays at zero voltage because the current and voltage signals driving
Port 2 will compensate to zero.
The function of the circulator in Figures 8 is easy to follow see Figure 9. A current
induced through a port by an external voltage will yield a voltage at the next port,
however, an internal voltage at the output of a VA will not result in any voltage at the
next port, see the explanation below. The input/output resistance of the ports is Z
0
 and
they should be driven by the same external resistance value. The external resistances
are grounded in this figure representing zero voltage drive. When one of them (Port 1
in Figure 9) is not grounded, but a voltage U drives it via the external Z
0
, a voltage of
U/2 drops on that port. The same voltage (U/2) will be distilled on the next port, too.
On the other hand, the corresponding current flowing out at the next port via the
related CVC yields an internal voltage component at the output of that CVC which
kills further voltage propagation at the input of the VA driving the subsequent (third
port). Thus the third port stays at zero voltage. Because the system is linear, the ports
can be run independently and the distillation will satisfy the linear superposition
theorem. However, it is essential to recognize that these idealistic working conditions
of the circulator can never be reached. Depending on the practical inaccuracies of the
resistance values and amplification, the same order of relative errors will occur in
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signals on the relevant output ports. Furthermore stray signals with the same order of
relative amplitude will occur on ports which should show zero voltage at ideal
conditions. Thus, in the secure key exchange schemes analyzed below, practical
inaccuracies in the circulator will lead to additional information leak, out of the
known ones, such as the non-zero cable resistance.
3.2 Generalized circulator schemes (unrelated to Johnson noise) for secure key
exchange
In Figure 10, the generalization of Liu's circulator-based communicator (Liu-cypher)
is shown. The Liu-cypher works by emulating the Johnson noise situation, that is, the
net power flow between Alive and Bob is zero. It is unnecessary to make Johnson
noise calculations because the system can securely designed without the knowledge of
the corresponding Johnson noise situation. We will point out that the best practical
situation is when only one side is using a circulator, the other one is using just a
resistance Z
0
 and a noise voltage generator.
The generalized circulator-cypher in Figure 10 consists of a noise generator at
each side (UA (t)  and UB (t) , respectively), a circulator, and a voltage amplifier. The
voltage amplifier outputs, with distilled voltage originating from the other end of the
line, are added to the noise generator voltages. The resultant channel voltage and
current contributions originating from Alice are given by
Uch,A =UA,tot (1+ B) /2      and     Ich,A =UA,tot (1 B) /2Z0 ,    (15)
respectively. The resultant channel voltage and current contributions from Bob are:
Uch,B =UB,tot (1+ A) /2    and   Ich,B =UB,tot (1 A) /2Z0 .    (16)
With proper distillation factors A , B and noise generator voltages UA(t), UB(t), the
security is ensured by running the system with zero net power flow. The security
condition, that is, the requirements for zero average power flow between Alice and
Bob, are as follows (the linear superposition theorem and the statistical independence
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of the noise generators of Alice and Bob are supposed):
Uch,A  Ich,A
t
= Uch,B  Ich,B
t
        UA,tot2 (t) (1 B)2 = UB,tot2 (t) (1 A)2    (17)
One might argue that the line-node resistors of the circulators of Alice and Bob
dissipate equal energy, however this is irrelevant because that neglects the fact that the
real issue is the power balance between the correlated voltage generators at the two
ends. The line-node resistors have always the same current, because this is a single
loop. Therefore, their power dissipations are always trivially equal, even when their
total power balances are different.
Alice
Z0
UA(t)
Bob
UB(t)
Z0 Z0 Z0
A UB,tot(t) B UA,tot(t)
UA,tot(t) UB,tot(t)
UA,tot(t)/2UB,tot(t)/2
1
23
1
23
2A 2B
Uch,B = UB,tot (1+ A) /2
Uch,A = UA,tot (1+ B) /2
Ich,A =UA,tot (1 B) / 2Z0
Ich,B = UB,tot (1 A) /2Z0
U
A,tot
2
(t) (1 B)2 = U
B,tot
2
(t) (1 A)2
Figure 10. The generalized circulator-based secure key exchange to replace the Liu-cypher proposed in
[1]. Voltage amplifier outputs with distilled voltage of the other end are added to the noise generator
voltages. With proper distillation factors A, B and noise generator voltages UA(t) and UB(t), the system
can run with the zero net power flow condition to maintain security. The Johnson noise equations are
not needed for the design. In the best circulator-based system either A or B is zero, which means that
one of the circulators and amplifiers can be left out, see Figure 11.
To determine the needed noise voltage generator contributions by Alice and Bob, we
must realize that the system has a positive feedback loop at nonzero A and B because
the voltage generated at one side will be distilled at the other side and fed into the line
there. However, that distilled voltage will also be re-distilled and added to the original
voltage at the first side; and so on. Positive feedback amplifies the incoming noise
voltages UA (t)  and UB (t)  and the total voltage contributions of the two sites are
20
given as:
UA,tot (t) =
UA (t)
1 AB and UB,tot (t) =
UB (t)
1 AB .    (18)
Equation 18 is deduced from
UA,tot (t) =UA (t) + AUB,tot (t) and UB,tot (t) =UB (t) + BUA,tot (t)    (19)
by considering one of the cases of UA (t) = 0  or UB (t) = 0 . It can be seen from
Equations 19 that the positive feedback's loop-amplification (AB) will enhance the
input noise generator voltages of Alice and Bob by the same factor.
After these preparations, the design of a secure circulator-based system is
straightforward by using Equations 14-18 and the knowledge and application of the
Johnson noise equations (current and voltage [2]) are unnecessary unless the task is
to exactly emulate a concrete situation with Johnson noise.
Alice
Z0
UA(t)
Bob
UB(t)
Z0 Z0
A UB(t)
UA,tot(t)
UB,tot(t)/2
1
23
2A
Figure 11. The simplest circulator-based cypher which is also the most robust because there is no
positive feedback loop in this system therefore the nonideality, bandwidth and transient problems are
kept at the lowest level here.
Though the conceptual/idealized Liu-cypher (Figure 10) is secure against passive
attacks (but not against the man-in-the-middle attack, see Section 3.3) the positive
feedback loop in the circulator system with A > 0 and B > 0  coefficients raises
serious concerns about the practical security. It follows from the well-known facts in
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basic electronics that any non-idealities, such as nonlinearity, frequency-dependence,
wire resistance, wire capacitance, will be enhanced by a positive feedback loop. This
situation will help Eve to enhance the information leak normally present in any
practical KLJN cypher. Moreover, it opens new information leak channels due to the
circulator circuit non-idealities. Therefore, these effects must be thoroughly analyzed
and addressed during an actual design and the tools of necessary protection installed.
However, this situation can be improved by avoiding a positive feedback loop
with circulator only at one end. The modified circulator-based cypher is shown in
Figure 11. In the figure, only Alice has circulator; Bob's side has only a noise
generator and Z0 . To enhance security the decision of using a circulator or not should
be made randomly at each clock period. Clearly, only the asymmetric situations of
Alice and Bob count as secure bit.
3.3 Cracking all the circulator-based key exchange schemes
We now show that Liu-cypher and its generalizations discussed above are vulnerable
against even a simple attack utilizing circulators. It is important to note that the attack
described below does not address small information leaks like the ones generally
present in any practical (classical and quantum) communicators (see Sections 1 and 2)
and which can be removed by privacy amplification. The issue here is fatal. We show
that Eve can extract exactly the same amount of information as Bob and Alice share.
That is, no secrecy remains implying that no privacy amplifier or other method can be
used to guarantee security. The major conceptual disadvantage of any of the
circulator-based cyphers (including the Liu-cypher) is that they are absolutely
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks executed by similar circulators (see Figure
12). This is because Eve can break the line and install a properly wired circulator pair,
which is basically a circuit acting as a repeater in both directions. Node-1 of
circulator Eve-A is connected to Alice via the line and Eve-A distills half of Alice's
total voltage (U
A, tot
/ 2) at its node-2. That node, after a voltage amplification of a
factor of 2, will drive node-3 of Eve's other circulator, i.e. Eve-B. Thus, idealistically,
Node-1 of Eve-B will exactly emulate the original voltage (U
A, tot
) and current
contribution of Alice toward Bob. The same holds in the reverse direction, too. Node-
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1 of circulator Eve-B is connected to Bob via the line and Eve-B distills half of Bob's
total voltage (U
B, tot
/ 2) at its node-2. That node, after a voltage amplification of a
factor of 2, will drive node-3 of Eve's other circulator, Eve-A. Thus, idealistically,
Node-1 of Eve-A will exactly emulate the original voltage (U
B, tot
) and current
contribution of Bob toward Alice. In this way, the feedback loop is closed and the
original functions of the circulators of Alice and Bob are restored by Eve's repeater.
However Eve can measure U
A, tot
 and U
B, tot
 therefore she identifies the shared bit with
the same accuracy as Alice and Bob; while Eve extracts the whole information, the
current and voltage based alarm system does not recognize the attack situation.
In conclusion, the circulator-based key exchange protocols have zero protection
against a circulator-based man-in-the-middle attack, as stated.
Bob
Z
0
Z
0
U
B,tot
U
A,tot
/2
Alice
Z
0
Z
0
U
A,tot
U
B,tot
/2
Eve-A
Z
0
Z
0
U
A,tot
/2
Eve-B
Z
0
Z
0
U
B,tot
/2
3 3 3 32 22 2
1 1 1 1
U
B,tot
2x
2x
U
A,tot
Eve's MITM attack circuitry
Figure 12. Cracking all circulator-based communicator schemes (including the Liu-cipher, the
generalized cipher and the cipher on Figure 10) by a circulator-pair based man-in-the-middle attack.
3.4 Robustness of the security of the original Johnson noise based scheme
It can be shown that, using two different pairs of properly modified (asymmetric)
circulator circuits, or two different wiring of an asymmetric circulator pair,
corresponding to situations of the different resistance values used by Alice and Bob, a
modified circulator-based man-in-the-middle attack can also be carried out against the
original KLJN cypher. Asymmetric circulators, circulators with different node
23
resistances, are needed for making a repeater because of the asymmetric resistor
values of Alice and Bob during exchanging a secure bit. However, because Eve does
not know which resistor Alice and Bob will choose, Eve does not know which
arrangement of the circulators should be used. Her chance to succeed with a single bit
is 25% because there are 4 distinct possibilities. That is, 75% is the probability that
there is a mismatch and current/voltage based alarm will go on during a single bit
extraction attempt by Eve. Thus the probability that Eve can stay hidden for N bits is
(0.25)
N
. Note, only half of those bits will be useful because the LL and HH cases can't
be used. Thus Eve's chance that she can extract 10 key bits without igniting the alarm
is less than one trillionth. In conclusion, the original Johnson-like noise based KLJN
system is secure even against a circulator-based man-in-the-middle attack.
4. Key Exchange by Dropping High-Risk Bits
We now comment a second remark in [1] stating: Alice and Bob “can drop high risk
bits from the stream to decrease the risk [2]. Such an approach will reduce the
effective key generation rate and is subject to further crypto-analysis.”
We first note that the high-risk bits destined to be dropped in [2] are restricted
only to the LL and HH bits because the state of the system is always publicly known
for these types of bits. Accordingly, the locations of all such bits are also publicly
known and hence, these bits can be dropped without loss. Clearly, this transformation
will halve the key generation rate, as the LL and HH bits form about 50% of all the
bits. We also note that dropping the LL and HH bits is done automatically at the very
beginning and is a trivial but essential step of the secure key exchange method
described in [2]. Neither Alice and Bob nor Eve will try to use these bits anymore.
Thus, in what follows, we focus only on sequences not containing any LL and HH
bits. Such sequences will be referred to as basic sequences.
Besides LL and HH bits, we have to consider the other type of high-risk bits
causing information leak due to non-idealities, stray components, inaccuracies, etc.
This type of high-risk bits is of completely different nature (see [1] and [2] for a
detailed discussion). To comment the remark cited above from [1] for these types of
high-risk bits, we first recall that Alice and Bob have full knowledge of the system
state, as well as of the whole information (current/voltage data) Eve can have. To the
best of our knowledge, this is a unique characteristic feature of the KLJN cypher
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among the existing physical secure key exchange systems that can be utilized in
improving the security. Moreover, Alice and Bob also know the best strategy for the
most efficient bit estimation. Since they can assume without loss of generality that
Eve uses this best strategy, Alice and Bob also know her guess, or equivalently, they
know whether or not Eve's guess is correct. On the other hand, Eve knows the
probability P (>0.5) by which she can successfully guess the LH and HL bits in the
underlying system. However, she never knows if her guess of a particular LH or HL
bit is correct or not. We recall that the success probability P can be derived from the
system parameters; we consider the worst-case scenario that these parameters are
publicly known. Below we assume the much worse case that Eve knows not only P,
but even the number M of correctly guessed LH and HL bits. This assumption enables
a simplified analysis of the number of potential keys. For the rest of this section, by
high-risk bits we will mean the LH  and H L bits correctly guessed by Eve.
Furthermore, we will always assume that the underlying key exchange protocol is also
known for Eve. Before going into the details, we note that if Alice and Bob use the
entire basic sequence as final key then, for all basic sequences, the number of
potential keys for Eve is exactly 



M
N
. This number will be regarded as the baseline
measure for the risk.
a) Consider first the key exchange protocol that Alice and Bob drop all high-risk
bits from the basic sequence. Since Eve knows N  and M , as well as the
protocol, she can obtain the set of potential keys for this case by dropping M
bits from the basic sequence in all possible ways. Thus, 



M
N
 remains an
upper bound on the number of potential keys and hence, this protocol does not
decrease the baseline risk. It can, however, increase it because the sharpness of
the above bound depends on the basic key eavesdropped by Eve. As an
extreme example, consider the case that Eve’s basic sequence consists of only
ones. Clearly, she can easily reason that the final key is the sequence
consisting of MN   zeros. Thus, dropping all high-risk bits may only
increase the baseline risk.
b) We now show that there exists no deterministic strategy based on dropping
any subsets of the high-risk bits from the basic sequence such that it results in
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an increase of the security (i.e, in a decrease in the baseline risk). In fact, any
such deterministic strategies may result only in a decrease in the security (see
the case above for an extreme situation). More precisely, suppose that Alice
and Bob determine the final key by a function T assigning a sequence k to the
pair (kAB,kE ), where
a. 
AB
k  is the basic sequence communicated by Alice and Bob,
b. 
E
k  is the sequence eavesdropped by Eve, and
c. k is obtained from 
AB
k  by dropping some high-risk bits.
For this protocol, Eve can guess 
AB
k  from her sequence 
E
k  in 
N
M
 
  
 
   different
ways and then, as she knows T by the worst-case assumption, apply T to
(kAB
'
,kE ) for every guess kAB
' . The number of potential keys is therefore also
at most 



M
N
, i.e., even this more general strategy based on dropping any
subsets of the high-risk bits does not decrease the risk. Notice, however, that
the above bound is sharp only when T is injective in its first argument; all
other choices of T do increase the baseline risk. We also note that the argument
above holds for any arbitrary function T, i.e., T need not be restricted to
dropping high-risk bits.
c) Finally, we consider the case that Alice and Bob do not fix some deterministic
strategy in advance and generate the final key from the basic sequence by (i)
selecting first the high-risk bits to be dropped with some unknown strategy
and (ii) exchanging then the positions of the bits kept. As an example of this
protocol, consider the case that Alice first selects the high-risk bits to be
dropped by some stochastic method (e.g., simple coin toss) and sends then
these bit positions to Bob. (For the authentication, she can again utilize the
KLJN cypher, as it is robust against the “man-in-the-middle” attack [12].) We
regard again the worst-case that Eve is aware of the number M ' (M '< M ) of
high-risk bits dropped from the basic sequence, as well as of the N-M’ bit
positions kept from the basic sequence. Using these assumptions, for this case
she can determine the set of potential keys by
1) dropping first the same M ' bits from her eavesdropped sequence,
2) choosing N-M+M ' positions in the sequence obtained, and
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3) inverting each bit in all selected positions for every choice.
Since different choices in step 2) result in different keys in step 3), the number
of potential keys is equal to the number 
N M '
N M + M '
 
  
 
  =
N M '
M M '
 
  
 
   of possible
choices. As 



M
N
> 





'
'
MM
MN
 always holds for every M ' >0, dropping only
high-risk bits increases the risk for this protocol as well and is therefore a non-
optimal strategy.
A more generalized and practical crypto analysis of the privacy amplification of
the non-idealistic KLJN cypher, including the situation when Eve works with the
combination of the various strategies and utilizing system parameter fluctuations, is
currently in progress by the present authors.
Conclusions
After analyzing the relevant cable and circuit systems, we have refuted most of the
claims in [1] concerning the security of the circulator-based key exchange system and
the theory of the KLJN cypher. In particular, in contrast to the conclusion of [1], we
have shown that:
(i) the circulator-based key exchange system described in [1] is insecure and
(ii) the arguments in [1] do not break the security of the KLJN system [2].
We have also studied a remark in [1] about a security-enhancing method based on
dropping high-risk bits and shown for different protocols that this method does not
increase the security. Our unpublished preliminary results however indicate that this
method could still be useful if not only high-risk bits are dropped from the sequence
communicated by Alice and Bob.
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